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1. Introduction
1.1 The need for banking and payment services among low- and moderate-income
households

Bank account ownership and financial inclusion are widely viewed as necessary conditions for
improving the economic well-being of low- and moderate-income (LMI) households, yet 25% of
households in the United States earning under $20,600 per year do not have a bank account
(Blank and Barr (eds.) 2008, Bucks et al. 2009). 1 As articulated in Caskey (1996), Barr (2004),
and Blank and Barr (eds., 2008), LMI households need affordable bank accounts to make
payments, obtain credit, save for short-term emergencies, and build longer-term assets.
Increasing the capacity of LMI households to build savings as a buffer against emergencies may
promote their financial stability and improve their income and employment opportunities.
Without affordable and accessible banking services, these households frequently use non-bank
substitutes – a typical LMI household spends around half of its annual outlays on financial
services in the high-priced alternative financial services sector to obtain services, such as checkcashing, wire transfers, and short-term credit, and has little savings (Barr et al. 2009). 2 From a
public policy perspective, this financial exclusion and use of high-priced alternative financial
services undermine the government’s mechanisms for income redistribution, reduce the
employment incentives of programs such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and reduce
the positive network externalities in electronic payment systems (Humphrey et al. 2001, Barr
2004). 3 We contend that an understanding of preferences for payment card features can help
improve the overall equity of the banking system by building upon the efficiency gains from
electronic payments.
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A payment card, a broad term used in this paper to include debit, prepaid debit, and
payroll cards but exclude gift cards, provides the user with an electronic method of receiving
income, making purchases, paying bills, and withdrawing cash. Also, payment cards offer the
holder the opportunity to save, for example, through a linked account at a bank that is separate
from the account for the card. Payment cards typically do not enable check-writing and can be
set up without the ability to overdraft, thus minimizing risks and administrative costs for
financial institutions and consumers.
Payment cards come in several forms, including debit cards, payroll cards, or prepaid
debit cards, such as MasterCard or Visa prepaid debit cards. In this study, we use the term “debit
card” to describe basic cards that are linked to a source of funds and can be used with a personal
identification number (PIN) at ATM machines and at larger retailers that have PIN pads at the
point of sale. A “payroll card” is set up by the cardholder’s employer and enables employees to
electronically draw their pay from a pooled account. A “prepaid debit card” is not associated
with an individually owned bank account, but is instead loaded with funds by the consumer or a
third party. Payroll and prepaid debit cards can be structured to have federal deposit insurance.
Unlike the basic debit card, these cards are typically offered through the MasterCard or Visa
network and can generally be used at any retailer that is a part of these networks with a signature
rather than the entry of a PIN. Each of these payment cards poses different costs and risks to the
financial institution providing the card, with payroll cards generally being less expensive and
risky than prepaid debit cards requiring only a signature; both of these cards tend to be less
expensive than debit cards linked to a source of funds.
To date, the patchwork of public and private payment card programs are quite fragmented
and neither sector offers a broadly available payment card product that is affordable, transparent,
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and reflects the preferences of LMI households. After the 1996 welfare reform law, states began
to disburse public assistance benefits, such as food stamps and welfare, electronically onto debit,
or electronic benefit transfer (EBT), cards. Also, for the unbanked, many states provide the
option of receiving unemployment insurance benefits on EBT cards. Most states do not establish
individually owned accounts linked to EBT cards for benefit recipients, and instead use a private
contractor to provide cards for recipients to access funds held by the state government in a
pooled account (Barr 2004). The federal government deploys a prepaid card, Direct Express, to
electronically deliver payments to unbanked Social Security beneficiaries. Use of the card has
grown rapidly and now reaches over one million participants. Both state and federal cards
currently lack full functionality, such as the ability for cardholders to receive other income, pay
bills electronically, or set up savings accounts. As currently structured, publicly offered payment
cards are limited in their use and accordingly, LMI households cannot use these cards to fulfill
many of their financial services needs. Similar to publicly offered payment cards, payroll cards
generally do not offer bill payment or savings mechanisms. The availability of these options
usually depends on the employers, who, like state governments, use a single contractor to allow
employees to withdraw funds from a pooled account.
Private sector payment card programs, on the other hand, offer a broader array of
financial services, but at a much higher price. For example, as shown in Appendix 1, two
popular cards charge activation fees ranging between $3.95 and $19.95 as well as monthly
maintenance fees between $5.95 and $9.95. 4 Also, additional charges apply for making
purchases with the card, making ATM withdrawals, enrolling in a bill payment plan, reloading
the card, and other uses of the card. If the cardholder is not savvy, the fees of a payment card
offered in the private sector can rival and even surpass those of check cashers and bank accounts.
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In addition to high fees, shopping for a payment card and picking one can be complicated
because the card’s fixed and variable costs are complex and hidden. Also, the services offered
on a card are often bundled. For example, one card charges a different set of fees depending on
whether the cardholder chooses to pay a large up-front activation fee or a lower monthly fee.
Another card offers an entirely different menu of fees and services. Moreover, consumers’
cognitive biases may make comparing the two cards difficult, as their respective costs depend on
how the cardholder anticipates loading the card with money and how frequently purchases are
expected to be made.
Federal consumer protection regulations for payment cards may leave gaps in coverage or
create confusion. 5 The FDIC’s deposit regulations and the Federal Reserve’s Regulations D and
E stipulate deposit insurance and liability protection for payment cards, but these rules do not
necessarily apply to all types of payment cards or their holders in all situations. When a card is
lost or stolen and the cardholder does not report a stolen or missing card within two business
days, the cardholder is not fully protected. Also, cardholder’s responsibility for charges made is
capped at $50 only if the cardholder is able to prove that she did not “recklessly” use or misplace
the card. In some cases, deposit insurance may not “pass through” to a cardholder if the account
linked to the card is linked to a pooled account without individually assigned sub-accounts (as
may often be the case with a private payroll card). The cardholder agreements of the most
popular prepaid branded payment cards warn that in the event of a loss or theft, it is possible
under certain circumstances for the holder to lose all of the money that has been loaded onto the
card.
Given that public and private payment cards offer an incomplete spectrum of affordable
and transparent financial services, the use of payment cards, though growing, is not widespread
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among LMI households (Romich et al. 2009). This suggests that there is a possibility in the
current payment card marketplace to provide more affordable financial services through payment
cards without hidden fees to LMI households. Public subsidies to banks are one potential
implementation of expanded payment card offerings to these households, as are efforts to reduce
acquisition costs through widespread programs for the direct deposit of tax refunds and
government benefits onto such cards. 6 Another potential implementation strategy is to integrate
card programs into the “Bank On” initiatives in cities around the country that provide low-cost
starter bank accounts and financial education for unbanked households. These programs also
seek to develop new bank products for unbanked households.
This study contributes to this policy discussion by characterizing the features of an
account-based payment card – including bank debit cards, prepaid debit cards, and payroll cards
that elicit a high take-rate among low- and moderate-income (LMI) households, particularly
those without bank accounts. To the best of our knowledge, no large-scale study identifies how
preferences over monetary and non-monetary features of a payment card influence its use. 7
Previous research on electronic payment methods has focused on individuals’ decisions to
choose among different electronic payment methods, such as debit cards, credit cards, and
electronic funds transfer (EFT) (Hirschman 1982, Kennickell and Kwast 1997, Mantel 2000).
Related research demonstrates the substantial sensitivity of consumers’ use of an electronic
payment method to its own price (Humphrey et al. 2001, Amromin et al. 2007, Borzekowski et
al. 2008). In this prior research, it is unclear whether the non-monetary aspects of electronic
payment methods, such as how money is loaded onto the card, whether a card has lost card
protection, or how the card is branded, are quantitatively important. Also, the importance of nonmonetary costs relative to the monetary costs of electronic payments is not well understood.
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Recent research, however, emphasizes the relative importance of non-monetary factors in
influencing the financial decisions of the poor (Bertrand et al. 2006). An aggregated view of
consumer preferences that does not distinguish between monetary and non-monetary features
leaves financial institutions, payment card providers, employers, and government agencies
uninformed on how to design payment cards to maximize take-up among LMI households.

1.2. Analysis approach
Drawing on methods from marketing research, we develop a discrete-choice model of
LMI households’ preferences for payment cards as a function of the features of the payment
card. We then use this model to predict take-up rates for payment cards with different
combinations of monetary and non-monetary features. By assigning costs to different payment
card designs, policymakers and financial institutions can assess the net benefits implied by the
costs and take-rates of various payment cards. The proposed analysis approach can be used by
policy makers determine which payment card is most profitable (or least unprofitable) given
costs and demographics in a particular local and whether or not subsidies or other public
intervention is necessary to entice private institutions to offer payment cards.
The model we use allows us to compare (among other things) whether banked and
unbanked respondents value the features in similar (or different) ways. This comparison is
facilitated by the hierarchical multinomial logit specification used in the discrete choice model.
At the lower level in this model, we estimate a relationship between observed payment card
choices and unobserved consumer preferences for payment card features (cf. Rossi, Allenby and
McCulloch 2005, Train 2003). In the upper level of the model, these consumer preferences are
modeled as a linear function of LMI households' characteristics, including whether they have a
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bank account, income, age, race, and gender. This structure enables us to analyze whether LMI
households’ preferences for payment card features differ depending on income, age, race and
gender. This modeling structure also allows us to extrapolate from a representative sample of
LMI households in Detroit in order to predict take-up rates for other cities with a different
distribution of demographic and socio-economic characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the survey and
modeling approach that was used to estimate the discrete-choice model. Section 3 presents the
estimated demand model parameters and, in particular, the role of non-monetary cost factors.
Section 4 concludes with policy implications and suggested guidelines for institutions who wish
to target payment cards for LMI households.

2. Measuring consumer preferences for purchase cards
2.1 Data collection
There are a number of different features that a payment card can offer that can change
the cost of offering the card and the level of services available to LMI users. These features are
summarized in Table 1 and described in more detail in Appendix 2. This study collected data
specifically designed to measure how the features in Table 1impact take-rates for purchase cards
among LMI households.
The limited use of payment cards by LMI households in the market place makes it
difficult to assemble market data to estimate preferences for the various features described in
Table 1, particularly since we are interested the preferences of non-users as well as users. As a
result, we chose to estimate our model for payment card take-up based on hypothetical choices
made by LMI households in a survey (following the 'conjoint analysis' or 'discrete-choice survey'
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approach, c.f. Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000). These hypothetical choice questions are from
the Detroit Area Household Financial Services (DAHFS) study, a broader survey of LMI
households in Detroit administered by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.
The survey was conducted as a computer-assisted, in-person survey from July 2005 through
March 2006. In addition to the choice questions on purchase cards, the survey asked many
questions about LMI individuals’ experiences with mainstream and alternative financial services,
in addition to their socio-economic characteristics, saving/borrowing attitudes, and net asset
portfolio. Respondents took on average 76 minutes to complete the DAHFS survey; the choice
questions represent a small fraction of this time. The survey was pre-tested on a sub-sample of
LMI households to validate wording and other aspects of the survey instrument. Because we
were concerned about the overall literacy level and the ability of respondents to provide reliable
responses to seemingly difficult questions about financial behaviors, we also conducted cognitive
interviews regarding the most difficult questions, including the discrete-choice portion of the
survey, and modified the instrument based on how respondents processed the questions (c.f.
Presser et al. 2004). In the discrete-choice portion of this survey, respondents were asked to
answer a series of 13 questions where they indicated which of 3 alternative payment cards they
found most attractive (see Appendix 3 for an example question). Each question also includes a
‘none’ or no-purchase option. The attributes and levels for the alternatives in each question
followed an experimental design created using Sawtooth Software’s Choice-Based Conjoint
package (Sawtooth Software, 2007).
The survey sample was carefully constructed to be representative of households living in
LMI neighborhoods in the Detroit metropolitan area. We randomly selected sample members to
form a stratified random sample of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb counties. Because we
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constructed the sample frame to include more census tracts from the low- and moderate-income
strata (defined as tracts with median incomes that are 0-60% and 61-80% of the Detroit area’s
median income of $49,057), the sample frame includes more census tracts from the low- and
moderate- income strata than the middle stratum that consists of census tracts with median
incomes 81-120% of the area median. 8 Note that these stratum definitions do not restrict the
income levels of the sample members to fall within these ranges. Our sample consists of 1,003
interviews, with a response rate of 65 percent. Of those, 788 answered all of the discrete-choice
questions, as well as the five demographic and socio-economic questions we used in estimating
the demand model.

2.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Sample
Overall, the demographic characteristics of the sample reflect the average characteristics
of LMI households in the Detroit metropolitan area (see Barr et al. 2009 for a detailed
comparison). Our sample is socio-economically disadvantaged relative to the average U.S.
household. The sample is two-thirds African-American, two-thirds female, and unlikely to be
married. Nearly 30% have less than a high school diploma. While most of the respondents are of
working age, only slightly more than half were employed at the time of interview. The median
household income of the sample is $20,000, which is much lower than the Detroit metropolitan
area’s median income of $49,057 and the national median of $44,684. About one-third of these
households lived below the poverty line in 2004, and 29% percent do not have a bank account.
The modal respondent to the survey is an African-American working-age woman, without
children, who has lived in the Detroit area for a long time. Her income from work is low and
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close to the federal poverty line, and she likely receives some public assistance from the
government.
The survey identified a number of problems with bank account ownership among LMI
households. Among the 73% of respondents who have either a checking or savings account, 35%
overdrafted on their account at least once during the year prior to the survey interview. 9 During
this period, 13% paid a fee for going below their minimum balance. To identify which financial
barriers were most important to the unbanked, they were asked what improved feature of a bank
account would make them most likely to open an account. Unbanked respondents cite less
confusing fees (16%), lower minimum balances (14%), and the ability to get money faster (10%)
as the main obstacles they would like to see removed. For 29% of the sample, lower fees were
perceived as the primary facilitator to opening an account, while 20% considered more
convenient bank hours and locations as their chief motivation. Table 1 reports the distribution of
responses of the unbanked regarding the feature that would make them most likely to open a
bank account.
Respondents report difficulty maintaining a bank account. Despite being banked, 12% of
account holders had a previous bank account closed by the bank (not due to a move). Common
reasons for a bank closing an account include a low balance or an inactive account (63%) or
bounced checks and overdrafts (51%). In addition, 55% of the banked respondents closed a
previously held bank account voluntarily, most commonly due to the convenience of another
bank (27%) or excessive fees (21%). Among the unbanked, 70% report they chose to close the
account themselves, citing moving, worrying about bouncing checks, and having to pay fees as
their reasons for closing the account. The remaining formerly-banked, 30%, report that the bank
closed the account mostly due to bounced checks and overdrafts.
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In spite of how bank accounts are typically structured, there is interest among the
unbanked to have a bank account. Of the unbanked respondents, 75% say they would like to
open a bank account in the next year, and 33% say they have shopped around for a bank account.
However, 17% report that a bank denied their application to open a bank account.
The more-in-depth findings from other portions of the study can be found in Barr and
Dokko (2008), Barr et al. (2009), and Barr et al. (forthcoming).

2.3 Model Specification
To analyze the responses to the hypothetical choice questions in the discrete-choice
portion of the survey, we use a hierarchical multinomial logit model (c.f., Allenby and Ginter
1995, Train 2003). In this model, the choice made by consumer i in question t is related to the
vector of product attributes, xijt, for each alternative j through a vector of individual-level
parameters, βi. Specifically, the likelihood that alternative j* is chosen is given by the familiar
multinomial logit model: 10
p ( y it = j* | β i , {xijt }) =

exp( β i xij*t )

∑ exp(β x
i

ijt

)

(1)

j

The estimated parameters βi indicate respondent i’s strength of preference for the different levels
of the attributes. These parameters are assumed to arise from a multivariate regression relating βi
to a vector zi of known characteristics of consumer i. Specifically,

p(β i | z i , ∆, Σ ) = N K (∆z i , Σ) ,

(2)

where K is the number of attributes, Δ is the matrix of regression coefficients and Σ is the
covariance matrix of the error term. The matrix Δ describes the overall population preferences
for the different product attributes and the covariance between those preferences and the
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characteristics of the individuals. The matrix Σ describes how individual preferences vary around
the predictions of the regression model. This hierarchical structure allows us to understand how
consumer preferences for payment cards vary with the demographics of the respondent. The data
used to estimate the model consists of the product attributes in the discrete choice questions
{xijt}, the observed choices {yit}, and respondent characteristics, {zi}.
For this application, we specified the xijt as effects codes for the attribute levels described
in Table 1 plus a dummy variable for the ‘none’ option (or outside good), which resulted in 17
estimated attribute preference parameters for each respondent. To specify zi we chose 5
demographic variables from the survey that we believed were likely to be related to individuals’
payment card preferences and were relatively uncorrelated with each other. These included the
age of the respondent (centered at 40, approximately the median age), the gender of the
respondent, the log of the income (centered at $20K per year, approximately the median
income), a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has a bank account, and a dummy
indicating whether the respondent was not African American. We also included a dummy
variable for the moderate-income sampling strata versus the low-income strata in zi. Thus, each
estimated parameter in Δ describes how preferences for the payment card attributes vary with the
demographics of the respondent.
Our approach to estimation is Bayesian with conditionally-conjugate, diffuse, proper
priors for Δ and Σ, which allows us to use the usual Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler for the
hierarchical multinomial logit model (c.f., Rossi, Allenby and McCulloch. 2005). The priors on
Δ and Σ were

p (vec(∆)) = N KL (0, diag(1000))
p (Σ) = InvertedWishart( K + 2, I )
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where K is the number of attributes and L number of individual characteristics. The sampler was
coded using the R statistical language. Convergence of the sampler was assessed by comparing
two chains with different starting values; all parameters in Δ and Σ achieved Gelman-Rubin
potential scale reductions factors of 1.1 or less. Posterior inference was based on 200,000 draws,
thinned by 10 to reduce data storage requirements.

3. Discrete-choice model parameter estimates
The parameter estimates for the model suggest that there may be a significant opportunity to
induce take-up of a payment card among LMI households, and in particular those without bank
accounts and those who live in low-income census tracts. In this section, we describe the features
of a payment card that have the largest weight in determining individuals’ decisions about
payment cards. We also discuss demographic differences in the relative weight given to a
particular payment card feature as well as in the take-up rates of cards for different demographic
groups. The parameter estimates for the model are shown in Table 3. Parameters which are
different than zero (i.e., the 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior density do not span zero) are
highlighted in bold.
The first column in Table 3 shows the intercept parameters in Δ. Given the coding
scheme for the variables in zi, these intercept terms correspond to the average attribute partworths for the modal respondent in the sample who is unbanked. The parameters in Table 3
indicate that the most appealing payment card for this respondent is a debit card with no credit
check requirements, with federal lost card protection, that is loaded for a $2.95 fee, that has
unlimited cash withdrawal for $1.50 each, has a savings plan and no monthly fees. Columns 2-7
in Table 3 show the estimated parameters in Δ that describe how payment card preferences vary
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with respondent demographics. For example, the last row in Table 3 shows how preferences for
the outside good vary for different respondent groups. The outside good parameters describe how
likely the respondent was to choose one of the payment cards over the “none” option in the
discrete choice questions. Generally, lower values of the outside good parameter indicate more
interest in payment card products. The estimated parameters indicate that people who are older,
male and are not black are significantly less likely to find payment cards attractive. In other
words, respondents whose demographic characteristics suggest they have greater access to bank
accounts, and therefore an outside option, are less likely to report wanting a payment card (c.f.
Table 7 in Barr et al. 2009). Although not statistically significant, the estimated parameter in the
last row of column 2 indicates that those with bank accounts are also less interested in purchase
cards. 11 We also find that people with higher incomes are significantly more interested in
purchase cards, possibly due to greater economic activity and a stronger demand for financial
services.
Columns 2-7 in Table 3 also show some significant and interesting between-group
variation in the preferences for various purchase card attributes. Although almost all groups
prefer a debit card to a Master Card or payroll card, this distinction is not as important for those
with bank accounts (who already have debit cards) and those who are older (who are more likely
to have bank accounts and therefore debit cards). Similarly, federal deposit protection is
preferable to no protection among all groups, but is somewhat less important to those who are
male, older, and have lower incomes relative to the modal respondent in column 1. Put
differently, these patterns suggest that preferences for the availability of federal protection
among younger, female, and unbanked respondents (the reference category) are quite strong
relative to other demographic groups.
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Cards with savings plans are preferable to all groups, but are less important to those who
are male and those without bank accounts (who may not value the saving option as much as the
transactional features of a payment card). In other words, the banked are more likely to prefer the
savings feature of the payment card, perhaps because, on the margin, this attribute may provide a
service that banked households may not necessarily have. There is statistically significant
variation across respondent groups in preferences for the method of loading the card. A
respondent who is unbanked and not African American will, on average, prefer to have the
employer load the card, while banked respondents prefer direct deposit. Respondents who are
African American show significantly less preference for cards that are loaded by employers,
which is consistent with sociological research finding a general distrust of employers among
inner-city African Americans (Wilson 1987, 1996). All respondent groups prefer cards with no
fees for withdrawing cash or no monthly fees, although those from moderate-income
neighborhoods find the $2.95 monthly fee less dissuasive than those who live in low income
census tracts.
The last column in Table 3 shows the parameter estimates for the diagonal elements in
Σ 12. These parameters describe how much variance we see in attribute preferences among
respondents with the same demographic profile. The high estimate for the variance in the outside
good parameter (19.20) indicates that there are large differences between respondents in their
preference for the outside good. This suggests that even that within each demographic group,
some respondents are very interested in purchase cards while others are not at all interested. This
heterogeneity suggests it is unlikely that a single card can be developed to be universally
accepted among all LMI households.
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The hierarchical model structure allows us to compute attribute importance estimates for
different combinations of socio-economic variables. In the first two columns of Table 4, we
contrast the average relative attribute importances for the modal unbanked respondent who lives
in a low income census tract to the modal banked respondent who lives in a moderate income
census tract. The first group of respondents place equal weight on monthly fees and the
availability of federal protection when they make their payment card decisions. After these two
features, the payment card’s type (debit v. payroll v. MasterCard) is an important factor. Like the
first group, the second group places the most importance on monthly fees and lost card
protection, but relative to the first group, they place a higher weight on the former and less
weight on the latter. Also, the second group of respondents places less importance on the card
type and more weight on the method of making deposits than the modal unbanked respondent in
Column 1. We also contrast these two low-income respondents with a middle-income male
resident of a moderate income census tract who is not African American, is age 40, and has a
bank account (Column 3). Like the first two groups, monthly fees have the greatest effect on the
purchase decisions for this group. In contrast to the other two groups, middle-income
respondents place less importance on lost card protection and more importance on the method of
making deposits. Also, for this group, the functional aspects of the payment card, such as the
availability of a savings plan and the method for paying bills, have less weight. By showing the
variation in attribute importance, the results in Table 4 suggest how different purchase card
programs could be tailored to appeal to various demographic groups.

3.2. Predicting Take-Rates
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As we discussed earlier, the discrete-choice model can be used by policy makers to
estimate the fraction of LMI households who report they would sign up for a payment card if
there were a payment card offered to them. We refer to this fraction as the take-rate. This takerate can be estimated for any combination of the payment card features described in Table 1,
based on the estimated likelihood of choosing a particular card versus choosing the outside good.
(Given the scarcity of payment card programs, take-rate estimates reported here assume that
there would only be one card available to LMI households. However the model could be used to
produce take-rates and market shares were multiple purchase cards available to a group of LMI
households.) We have developed an interactive tool that can be used to explore take-rates for
different payment card configurations and different subgroups of the Detroit LMI population. 13
Policy makers can use this tool to determine the take-rate for any payment card program, given
the target market in their locality (race, age, gender, access to bank accounts, etc.)
To demonstrate the approach, we used the tool to determine the payment card design that
would maximize the take-rate for the overall Detroit LMI population. The card maximizing the
take rate is a debit card with no credit check, federal lost card protection and an automatic
savings plan. The full profile for this card is described in the first column of Table 5. We
estimate that almost 52% of LMI respondents say they would enroll in a payment card program
designed in this particular way. The estimated take-rate is slightly higher for those that live in a
low-income census tract versus those in a moderate-income census tract(52.8% versus 50.8%).
The last two columns of Table 5 describe designs tailored to the unbanked and banked
subgroups, which are largely the same as the best design for the overall LMI population. If a card
were optimized for the unbanked subset of Detroit LMI households, the card would allow users
to pay bills in person with the card, be a debit card, and would achieve a 54% take-rate among
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the unbanked. A card optimized for the banked Detroit LMI households would be a MasterCard
instead of a debit card, and would achieve a 53% take-rate among the banked. Although a card
optimized for the unbanked achieves a lower overall take-rate than one optimized for the banked
or for the overall LMI population (50.4% v. 51.2% v. 51.8%), the estimates in Table 5 suggest
that tailoring a card to the unbanked will sacrifice little in terms of the take rate among the
banked.
It should be noted that the take rates shown in Table 5 are estimated from the survey
responses and therefore represent the likelihood that the respondent would say that they would
choose the card in a survey rather than actual behavior. Take rates in the marketplace may be
lower because respondents are not aware of the availability of payment card or because
respondents do not immediately take action as soon as a new product is available.

3.2. The Effect of Price on Take-Rates
The interactive tool can also be used to predict how the response varies with changes in
the design of the card. For instance, one can predict how take-rates might change if monthly fees
were added to the ideal card in the first column of Table 5. (Such fees might offset the costs of
providing payment cards.) Figure 1 shows that as monthly fees increase sharply, take-rates drop
off dramatically from 51.8% for the LMI population when there are no fees to 37.1% when the
monthly fees are $9.95. The difference in take rate for those who live in low versus moderate
income census tracts increases (39.5% versus 34.6%) when fees are $9.95, indicating that
demand for payment cards is less elastic in households that live in low-income census tracts.We
also find that those living in moderate income census tracts, who are more likely to have bank
accounts, are more sensitive to fees, suggesting greater substitutability between the payment card
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and a bank account for these households. Similarly, in Figure 2, we show the decline in takerates for banked and unbanked respondents. The take-rates for the banked are more sensitive to
monthly fees, consistent with the results in Figure 1.

3.2.1.1. Details of the take-rate calculations
In the model, the take-rate depends on the demographics of the consumers, and so we can
compute take-rates specific to any particular demographic profile. This allows policy makers to
compute take rates specifically for any local target population. Following the Bayesian approach,
we compute average the likelihood of the choice over the posterior. Specifically, the average
take-rate for a target design x for a respondent with demographics zi is computed as
take − rate = p( y i = target design ) =

∫ p( y

i

| x, β i ) p ( β i | z i , ∆, Σ) p (∆, Σ)d∆dΣ

∆ ,Σ

where p ( y i | x, β i ) is the likelihood that i will choose the target design, x, over the outside good
(based on equation 1), p ( β i | z i , ∆, Σ) is as given in equation 2 and p (∆, Σ) is the posterior
density of the model parameters. The integral is estimated by sampling from the posterior draws.
To estimate the take-rate for a population of respondents, we average the take rate over
some distribution of the demographic variables. For example, to estimate the take rate overall
among LMI households in Detroit, we use the distribution of zi observed in the survey sample.
One advantage of the hierarchical modeling approach is that we can also estimate take-rates for
another population of respondents, e.g. for a different city, simply by averaging over some other
distribution of zi.14 If p(zi) is the distribution of demographics for the population we wish to
estimate a take rate for, then the take-rate for the population is given by
= p (=
=
take − rate
yi target design)

∫∫

p( yi | x, β i ) p( β i | zi , ∆, Σ) p (∆, Σ)d ∆d Σ p ( zi )dzi

zi ∆ , Σ
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The take rates for the overall Detroit LMI population are shown in the first row of the
bottom panel of Table 5.

4. Costs and the profitability of payment-card
The design in the first column of Table 5 represents the ideal designs from the
consumer’s perspective. However, government agencies and private financial intuitions who are
designing payment card programs need to weigh the likely take-rates against the costs of offering
different features. Such an analysis also must consider the potential revenues that would be
generated by the various fees. When private firms design products for the market, the central
objective is profit. However, government agencies are considering developing payments cards
programs in an effort to improve the welfare of LMI households. We do not anticipate that lowfee payment cards will necessarily be profitable (else they would already be more widely
available in the private sector) and so government agencies need to weigh the costs of such a
program against the potential benefits to LMI households.
One approach to weighing costs of a payment card program against the social benefits to
an LMI household from having a payment card is to optimize the per-household cost of the
program, that is, the ratio of the costs to the number households who sign up for the program.
Costs for payment cards programs can be summarized as the fixed cost of developing a program,
C0, the cost of setting up an individual account, s, and the monthly cost (net of revenues from
fees) of servicing an account, c(x). The take-rate can be estimated using our discrete choice
model as the total number of individuals in the target population, M, times the take rate ρ (x) .
The per-household net present cost for the program is then
T
C0
+ s + ∑ δ t c( x) ,
Mρ ( x)
t =1
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where δ is the discount factor and T is the planning horizon. If the fixed costs of the program, C0,
are sufficiently large, then the cost of adding attractive features to the program may be offset by
the economies of scale gained by increasing the take-rate, ρ (x) .
Although we do not have access to the detailed cost data that would necessarily be
required for an agency to design a payment card program, we have developed a tool which can
be used by policy makers and private firms to optimize payment card designs to achieve the
lowest possible per-household net present cost. 15 The hierarchical Bayes model allows this tool
to adjust for any local demographic distribution (i.e., percent African American, percent low
versus moderate income, etc.) so that the take rate predictions are specific to the group targeted
by a particular program. This tool is available from the authors upon request.

5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The high estimated take-up rate for a low-fee payment card is encouraging for policymakers and
financial institutions interested in offering a broader range of payment card products to LMI
households. Whether the products should be made available through government initiatives or
by the private sector is a question left unanswered as we do not have proprietary data from
financial institutions on the costs of offering payment card services. Instead, we note that
policymakers and financial institutions can use our predicted take-up rates to weigh against cost
estimates to determine the optimal design of the payment card that achieves the lowest possible
per-household net present cost. The predicted take-up rates also inform whether the optimal
payment card would be profitable. In the case where the optimal payment card is not profitable
to the private sector but there are social benefits of expanding financial services to LMI
households, subsidies to private institutions or a publicly funded payment card may be

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art34

22

Barr et al.:

24
appropriate. One form of these subsidies might be for the government to provide a one-time
subsidy to financial institutions to for opening the account linked to a payment card as previous
research suggests that once an account is open, banks are able to profit from it on a monthly
basis if there are recurring payments of a sufficient size (Dove Associates and U.S. Department
of Treasury 1999). However, since prior research was based on the behavior of Social Security
recipients who may be less inclined to use the electronic features of the payment card, an
alternative form of the subsidy may be more appropriate for a payment card serving LMI
households more broadly.
While the results of the paper are encouraging for depository institutions interested in
selling payment cards or electronic-based financial services more broadly, it is important to
recognize that the results are derived from a hypothetical discrete-choice survey. The take-up
rates estimated in the paper presume that consumers are fully aware of the attributes of the
payment card, whereas in reality, substantial marketing and communication, which are costly,
may be necessary to impart this awareness to consumers. 16 Further research is needed to
understand how construal, situational factors, and cognitive principles, such as the payment
card’s default features or how costs are presented, may inhibit the actual take-up of a payment
card (Bertrand et al. 2006). Also, additional research is also necessary to identify whether
payment cards and the availability of mainstream financial services are indeed welfareimproving for low- and moderate-income households.
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1

Put differently, around 8% of U.S. households do not have a bank account (Bucks et al. 2009).
Median annual outlays are estimated to be $179, or 1% of annual income (Barr et al. 2009).
This amount is largely spent on transactional financial services.
3
For example, existing programs providing benefits to the poor could more efficiently transfer
resources to the poor if LMI households were to receive funds and pay their bills using modern
electronic funds transfer (EFT) systems instead of checks that are expensive for the payment
system to process and potentially subject to fraud.
4
Part of the reason why fees are so high might be that companies offering the most popular
payment cards are not banks and do not have direct access to the payments system. Instead,
these companies need to partner with a bank in order to issue the card.
5
Although federal consumer protections do not apply to publicly offered payment cards, such as
the EBT card, state government regulations ensure that cardholders do not lose the money that is
loaded on a card when it is lost or stolen.
6
Research on an early U.S. Treasury project in this area, Electronic Transfer Accounts, found
that banks are likely to need subsidies to cover the cost of opening an electronically based
account but could profitably offer the account on a monthly recurring basis (Dove Associates and
U.S. Department of Treasury 1999).
7
Romich et al. (2009) present results from a qualitative survey of 22 users of pre-paid cards.
8
With sampling weights, our sample represents the population of Detroit metropolitan area
residents living in low-, moderate-, and middle-income census tracts.
2

9

The estimate of the proportion unbanked (27%) is consistent with previous large-scale surveys of the
LMI population, which have estimated the proportion unbanked as 20-30% of households and 28-37% of
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individuals (Aizcorbe 2003; Dunham 1998; Seidman 2005). Evidence from nationally-representative
surveys suggests that the number is close to 10% of the overall population (Aizcorbe et al. 2003, Bucks et
al. 2006, 2009).
10
Throughout, we use the notation p(y | x) to indicate the probability (or probability density function for
continuous random variables) for y conditional on x. NK(μ, Σ) is used to denote the multivariate normal
distribution for a random vector of dimension K with mean vector μ and covariance matrix Σ.
11

Barr et al. (2009) show that in the DAHFS study, bank account ownership is highly correlated
with age, race, and income, which may help explain the relatively large standard error on the
estimated preference for the outside good among the banked.
12
To capture correlations between attribute preferences, we estimated a full covariance matrix
for Σ, but do not report the off-diagonal elements. There were few correlations with posterior
support far from zero. Full results are available upon request.
13
This tool is available upon request.
14
Although one must be carefully examine the underlying assumption that the relationship
between demographics and preferences holds between the target population and the survey
population used to estimate the model.
15
An example of how policy makers can use this tool is to project the revenues from a particular
card and compare this figure with the likely costs. In turn, this comparison can help policy
makers determine the size of the subsidy a depository institution would need, if any, in order to
profit from issuing a payment card.
16
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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Table 1. Attributes and Levels in the Payments Cards Questions.
Attribute

Levels

No credit check
Favorable credit report
Debit (ATM) Card
Card Type
Payroll Card
MasterCard Prepaid Debit Card
Federal protection
Lost Card Protection
No protection
Direct Deposit
Deposits
Employer loads cards
You cash check and load card for $2.95 fee
Automatic savings plan
Savings
No savings plan
Buy money orders with card
Automatic bill payment available
Bill Payment
Pay bills in person with card
Pay bills by phone or Internet with card
Get cash at any ATM, from bank tellers and with purchases at stores
Get Cash
Get cash at participating ATMs and with purchases at stores
4 free per month at the card issuer's ATMs; then $2.00 each
Cash Access Fees
$1.50 fee for each ATM cash withdrawl
$2.50 fee for each ATM cash withdrawl
No monthy fees with Direct Deposit of your paycheck
$2.95 per month fee
Monthly Fees
$5.95 per month fee
$9.95 per month fee
Requirements
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Table 2. Unbanked Respondents’ Answers to the Question About What Changes to a Bank
Account’s Features Would Make Them Most Likely to Open a Bank Account (N=268)

Lower Fees
Convenient Hours/Locations
Less Confusing Fees
Lower Minimum Balances
Get Faster Funds
Other
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Table 3. Estimates of the relationship between payment card features and households show the relative importance of payment
card features for the modal respondent (column 1) and differences between average preferences for the model respondent and
preferences of those who have higher income, are older, are male, are not African American or live in a moderate income
census tract (columns 2-7). 17
17

Estimates are posterior means estimated from the discrete-choice survey of residents of LMI census tracts in Detroit. Posterior
standard errors for estimated parameters are shown in parentheses. Parameters for which the 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior
do not span zero are highlighted in bold.
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Re s ponde nt Characte ris tics
inte rce pt
modal respondent
unbanked
low income tract (5)

requirements
card type

Purchase Card Attributes

protection
deposits
savings

bill pay

get cash
cash fee

monthly fee
outside good

no
yes
debit
master card
payroll
no
yes
fee
direct deposit
employer
no
yes
money order
automatic
by phone
in person
participating
any
free
$1.50
$2.50
free
$2.95
$5.95
$9.95

0.26
-0.26
0.44
-0.60
0.17
-0.70
0.70
0.21
-0.08
-0.13
-0.22
0.22
-0.16
0.22
-0.02
-0.04
-0.04
0.04
-0.06
0.23
-0.17
0.61
0.26
-0.09
-0.78
1.24

(0.05)
(0.23)
(0.13)
(0.06)
(0.13)
(0.12)
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.1)
(0.06)
(0.09)
(0.1)
(0.12)
(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.35)
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has bank
account

-0.11
0.11
0.00
0.48
-0.48
-0.05
0.05
-0.38
0.38
0.00
-0.15
0.15
0.05
-0.01
0.07
-0.12
0.06
-0.06
-0.02
-0.01
0.02
0.48
-0.07
-0.22
-0.19
0.53

log(income/
20,000)

0.00
(0.06) 0.00
0.02
(0.24) -0.04
(0.14) 0.01
-0.02
(0.07) 0.02
0.02
(0.14) -0.03
(0.13) 0.01
-0.01
(0.07) 0.01
-0.02
(0.09) 0.04
(0.08) -0.01
(0.1)
0.00
0.00
(0.07) 0.00
0.01
(0.09) -0.02
(0.1)
0.00
0.04
(0.11) -0.01
(0.14) -0.02
(0.15) -0.02
(0.35) -0.15

(0.01)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.06)

age
(decades)

-0.02
0.02
-0.13
0.16
-0.03
0.05
-0.05
-0.13
0.05
0.09
-0.01
0.01
-0.03
0.00
0.01
0.01
-0.02
0.02
-0.01
-0.01
0.02
0.04
-0.01
-0.05
0.02
0.76

male

-0.12
(0.02) 0.12
-0.11
(0.07) 0.07
(0.04) 0.03
0.22
(0.02) -0.22
-0.01
(0.04) 0.16
(0.04) -0.15
0.14
(0.02) -0.14
0.05
(0.03) -0.12
(0.03) -0.04
(0.03) 0.12
0.02
(0.02) -0.02
0.08
(0.03) -0.07
(0.03) -0.01
-0.07
(0.03) -0.01
(0.04) -0.06
(0.05) 0.15
(0.11) 0.70

unexplained
moderate
heterogeneity
income
not African
(variance)
American census tract
(6)

-0.01
(0.05) 0.01
-0.30
(0.22) 0.33
(0.12) -0.04
0.02
(0.06) -0.02
-0.61
(0.13) 0.23
(0.11) 0.38
0.04
(0.07) -0.04
0.02
(0.08) 0.03
(0.09) -0.12
(0.09) 0.07
-0.06
(0.06) 0.06
0.13
(0.09) -0.05
(0.09) -0.08
0.15
(0.13) 0.04
(0.13) 0.09
(0.15) -0.28
(0.34) 1.08

0.07
(0.06) -0.07
-0.22
(0.2)
0.25
(0.12) -0.03
0.09
(0.07) -0.09
-0.34
(0.13) 0.12
(0.11) 0.21
0.07
(0.08) -0.07
0.15
(0.09) -0.17
(0.09) 0.01
(0.1)
0.01
0.11
(0.07) -0.11
0.09
(0.09) -0.14
(0.11) 0.05
0.17
(0.13) 0.26
(0.13) -0.19
(0.15) -0.24
(0.38) 0.21

(0.06)

0.20 (0.02)

(0.23)
(0.13)

0.19 (0.02)
0.22 (0.02)

(0.06)

0.28 (0.03)

(0.13)
(0.12)

0.27 (0.03)
0.25 (0.03)

(0.08)

0.27 (0.03)

(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)

0.27 (0.03)
0.31 (0.04)
0.37 (0.05)

(0.07)

0.26 (0.03)

(0.09)
(0.1)

0.36 (0.04)
0.48 (0.05)

(0.11) 0.60
(0.12) 0.81
(0.14) 1.23
(0.4) 19.20

(0.07)
(0.09)
(0.15)
(1.75)
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Table 4. Relative importance of purchase card attributes indicate that female, African
American, unbanked respondents weigh lost card protection and monthly fees similarly in
choosing purchase cards, while banked and higher-income, male respondents find monthly
fees substantially more important than any other attribute. 18

Requirements
Card Type
Lost Card Protection
Deposits
Savings
Bill Payment
Get Cash
Cash Access Fees
Monthly Fees

(1)
female
black
$20K income
age 40
unbanked
low-income tract
9%
17%
24%
6%
7%
6%
1%
7%
23%
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Relative Attribute Importance
(2)
female
black
$20K income
age 40
banked
moderate-income tract
6%
8%
19%
13%
9%
3%
4%
2%
35%

(3)
male
not black
$50K income
age 40
banked
moderate-income tract
2%
11%
11%
25%
3%
3%
2%
6%
36%
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Table 5. Alternative Payment Card Designs and Take-Rates
Ideal Design for Detroit LMI Population

Requirements

Purchase Card Attributes

Card Type
Lost Card Protection
Deposits
Savings
Bill Payment
Get Cash
Cash Access Fees

Estimated Take-Rates

Monthly Fees

(1)
Detroit LMI Population

(2)
Detroit LMI Unbanked

(3)
Detroit LMI Banked

No credit check

No credit check

No credit check

Debit (ATM) Card

Debit (ATM) Card

MasterCard Prepaid Debit Card

Federal protection

Federal protection

Federal protection

Direct Deposit

Direct Deposit

Direct Deposit

Automatic savings plan

Automatic savings plan

Automatic savings plan

Automatic bill payment available

Pay bills in person with card

Automatic bill payment available

Get cash at participating ATMs and Get cash at any ATM, from bank
with purchases at stores
tellers and with purchases at stores
$1.50 fee for each ATM cash
withdrawl

$1.50 fee for each ATM cash
withdrawl

Get cash at participating ATMs and
with purchases at stores
$1.50 fee for each ATM cash
withdrawl

No monthy fees with Direct Deposit No monthy fees with Direct Deposit No monthy fees with Direct Deposit
of your paycheck
of your paycheck
of your paycheck

Detroit LMI Population

51.8%

50.4%

51.2%

Residents of Low Income
Census Tracts (stratum 5)

52.8%

51.4%

50.3%

Residents of Moderate Income
Census Tracts (stratum 6)

50.8%

49.2%

52.2%

Banked Detroit LMI Population

51.4%

49.2%

52.5%

53.0%

53.3%

47.8%

Unbanked Detroit LMI Population
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Figure 1. Response of take-rates to monthly-fees (lives in moderate- v. low-income
neighborhood).

Detroit LMI Population

Moderate Income

Low Income

55.0%

Take Rate

50.0%

45.0%

40.0%

35.0%

30.0%
None, with direct
deposit

$2.95

$5.95

$9.95

Monthly Fee
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Figure 2. Response of take-rates to monthly fees (banked v. unbanked).
Detroit LMI Population

Banked

Unbanked

55.0%

Take Rate

50.0%

45.0%

40.0%

35.0%

30.0%
None, with direct
deposit

$2.95

$5.95

$9.95

Monthly Fee

18

Attribute importance are computed based on the estimated mean utility parameters for the
demographic group. Attribute importance is the difference between the best and worst levels for
that attribute as a percentage relative to the other attributes.
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Appendix 1. Select Features of Two Popular Pre-Paid Cards Offered in the Private Sector
Card 1
Monthly Plan
$4.95 to $6.95

Card 2
Monthly Plan
$3.00

Pay As You Go
$19.95

$5.95 or Free if
cardholder loads
$1000/mo. or makes
30 purchase
transactions

$9.95

$1.95

Free at in-network
ATMS
$2.50 otherwise

2 Free withdrawals
per month, $2.50
thereafter

$1.95

Up to $4.95

Free

Free

Bill Pay Enrollment
Fee

NA

$2.00

$2.00

Bill Payment Fee

NA

$1.00

$1.00

Activation Fee
Monthly Charge

ATM Fee

Reload Fee
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Appendix 2. Example discrete-choice question
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Appendix 3. Detailed description of attributes and levels
Attribute
Requirements

Levels
Favorable credit report

Card Type

No credit check
A Debit (ATM) card
A Payroll card
MasterCard Prepaid debit card

Lost Card
Protection

Deposits

Federal protection

No federal protection
Direct Deposit
Employer Loads Card
Cash Check & Load Card for $2.95

Savings

Bill Payment

Get Cash

Automatic Savings Plan

No Savings Plan
Automatic Bill Payment
Pay Bills by Phone or Internet
Pay in Person
Buy Money Orders
Any ATM, bank teller, with purchase
Participating ATM

Cash Access
Fees

Monthly Fees

4 free per month at card issuer’s
ATM; then $2.00 each
$1.50 for each ATM cash withdrawal
$2.50 for each ATM cash withdrawal
No monthly fees with direct deposit
of paycheck
$2.95 per month
$5.95 per month
$9.95 per month

Description
Credit or ChexSystem report indicates no mishandling of
previous account 19
No credit check required
Allows access to a bank account where money is kept
Set up by employer to let holder withdraw from paycheck
at ATMs
Card holder loads with money from paycheck at a check
casher or other local store offering such cards
Protects holder of card with a $50 limit on losses if the
issuer notified within 48 hours that it has been lost or
stolen
Card holder is fully liable for losses
Employer directly deposits paycheck automatically into a
bank account
Employer automatically adds paycheck to card
Card holder cashes own checks and loads the money on a
card for $2.95 per-load fee
Card holder sets how much money from each paycheck is
automatically set aside into a savings account at bank that
is separate from account for card
No savings feature on the card or account
Card holder sets up card or account to pay monthly bills
Card holder pays by phone or internet using card
Card holder uses card to make payments at merchants and
agent locations
Card holder uses card to buy money orders to pay bills
Get cash at any ATM, bank tellers, and with purchases at
stores
Get cash at participating ATMs and with purchases at
stores
Types of fees card holder would pay to obtain cash

Types of fees card holder would pay to keep card or
account
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Appendix 3. Interviewer instructions for conjoint interview
This part of the survey is about payment cards. Payment cards are ways of getting your income
and paying for things. Payment cards include debit cards, payroll cards, and prepaid debit cards.
You will see a sample page, and then 13 sets of choices. Let’s look at the sample page together.
Each set will contain three payment card descriptions for you to consider, numbered 1, 2, and 3.
For each set, you will select the option you prefer, or choose “none”, number 4, if you do not like
any of the options.
All the cards would give you some way to get access to your paycheck immediately.
--Debit cards let your employer set up direct deposit of your paycheck automatically into
a bank account in your name and funds are available to you right away.
--Payroll cards are loaded with money automatically by your employer and funds are
available right away.
--Prepaid debit cards let you load your paycheck onto the card and have your funds
available right away.
At the bottom of each page is a place for you to indicate with an X which option you prefer. If
you would not choose any of the options, mark an X in the last box here. When you are finished,
I will enter the information into the computer.
If you have a question at any time you can just ask me.
We are almost done. This is your chance to help decide the best products in your community.
Additional instructions given to interviewer but not read aloud:
In these examples, you would not have to leave any money on the card or in the account from
month to month; no minimum balance would be required.
You would not be allowed to write checks against this card or account and no overdrafts would
be permitted.
You would be given a toll-free number that you could call to check your card account balance or
for help if you had any problems with the card.
If you choose a debit card from a bank, your account would be insured by the federal
government up to $100,000 per account.
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19

The ChexSystems is a consumer reporting agency that tracks individuals who have mishandled
bank accounts. Examples of mishandling include excessive overdrafts, account abuse, fraud, and
providing false information when opening an account.
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